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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, NAC, XH, SHUM
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

SUMMARY: IN A LENGTHY AND HIGH-QUALITY DISCUSSION OF
EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS, THE NORTH ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, ASSISTED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM
CAPITALS, FOCUSED ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN
RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS AND BROAD EAST-WEST ISSUES.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE GAVE A DETAILED
EXPOSITION OF US POSITION ON THESE ISSUES WHICH WAS
WELL RECEIVED BY ALLIED REPS. IN THE COURSE OF DISCUS-
SION, MOST ALLIED OFFICIALS SOUNDED CAUTIONARY NOTES
ABOUT PUSHING THE SOVIETS TOO FAR AND TOO FAST ON
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. WHILE THERE WERE VARIATIONS
OF APPROACH AND EMPHASIS, SEVERAL ALLIES PRECEIVED A
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POTENTIAL THRESHOLD BEYOND WHICH SUCH WESTERN PRESSURE
MIGHT LEAD TO SOVIET REACTIONS THAT COULD HINDER
FURTHER PROGRESS IN DETENTE. MOST SPEAKERS, HOWEVER,
THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE RECONCILED TO A CERTAIN AMOUNT
OF CRITICISM AS THE PRICE OF MAINTAINING DETENTE.
SPEAKERS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO ANALYZING
THE BACKGROUND OF, AND DIFFERENCES AMONG, DIFFERENT
DISSIDENT GROUPS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE.
OBVIOUSLY STIMULATED BY THE THE HIGH QUALITY OF DISCUS-
SION AND ANALYSIS, NAC MEETING WAS EXTENDED INTO

AN AFTERNOON SESSION. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS DEBATE WAS VALUABLE IN GIVING THE ALLIES AN OPPORTUNITY TO STATE THEIR VIEWS FULLY, TO HEAR US VIEWS IN DETAIL, AND TO SEEK TO INFLUENCE EACH OTHER'S THINKING. END SUMMARY.

1. FRENCH REPS (PERMREP TINE AND QUAI DIRECTOR FOR USSR/EE/ BEAUCHATAUD) PRESENTED VIEW THAT THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THE SOVIETS AWARE OF OUR ATTACHMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES. SUCH STATEMENTS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE MADE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE AND SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID COUNTERPRODUCTIVE REACTIONS FROM MOSCOW. IN THIS REGARD, THE FRENCH THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS AND SHOULD AVOID EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR PARTICULAR GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS. AS TO THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, THE WEST SHOULD STRESS OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION AND SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION IT IS SEEKING "A SETTling OF ACCOUNTS". IN CONCLUSION, TINE SAID THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE WESTERN STANCE WOULD BE ONE WHICH MANIFESTS POSSIBLY DIFFERING ATTITUDES ON SPECIFIC ISSUES BUT MAINTAINS A COMMON BASIC POSITION ON PRINCIPLE.

2. SPEAKING FOR THE UK, CARTLEDGE (FCO, HEAD OF SOVIET AND EE AFFAIRS) EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT DESPITE WESTERN CRITICISM ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SOVIETS
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CONTINUE TO GIVE PRIORITY TO PROGRESS IN SALT AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS SITUATION COULD, HOWEVER, BE MODIFIED IF THE KREMLIN PERCEIVED THE BEGINNINGS OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION MOVEMENT. CARTLEDGE ESTIMATED THE PRESENT NUMBER OF SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS DISSIDENTS AT 2,000, WITH APPROXIMATELY 100 WHO COULD BE DESCRIBED AS ACTIVISTS. THUS FAR, THE SOVIET THRESHOLD FOR SUCH CRITICISM AND FOR DISSIDENT ACTIVITY HAS PROVED HIGHER THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED AND THE US MIGHT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO RAISE IT STILL FURTHER. DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS IN THE WEST SHOULD VOICE THE VIEWS OF THEIR PUBLIC OPINIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS BUT SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME GIVE PRIORITY TO THE CREATION OF A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS DETENTE IS POSSIBLE.

3 MEYER-LANDRUT (FRG DEPUTY ASSISTANCE SECRETARY FOR EE AND THE USSR) SAID HE BELIEVES THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE SOVIET SECURITY APPARATUS HAS THE INTERNAL SITUATION UNDER COMPLETE CONTROL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SITUATION IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN POLAND WHERE THERE IS AN ALLIANCE OF SORTS AMONG THE WORKERS, THE

INTELLECTUALS, AND THE CHURCH. AFTER BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE DISSIDENT SITUATION IN OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, MEYER-LANDRUT NOTED THAT THE WESTERN SUPPORT FOR THE DISSIDENTS INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATION. AS A RESULT, THE EASTERN REGIMES ARE OBLIGED TO TAKE SUCH PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS INTO ACCOUNT. THE WESTERN APPROACH ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE SHOULD, IN THE FRG VIEW, BE A CAREFULLY BALANCED LINE WHICH CAN WIDEN THE ROOM FOR MANEUVER FOR INDIVIDUALS,

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WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRESERVING THE GOAL OF ALLOWING EAST-EUROPEAN NATIONS TO DEVELOP STRONGER ECONOMIC AND OTHER TIES TO THE WEST.

4. VAN EEKELEN (NETHERLANDS NFA DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND ATLANTIC COOPERATION AFFAIRS) STRESSED THAT THE WEST HAS THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER BELGRADE, BUT THE QUESTION IS HOW HARD TO PUSH BEFORE EXCEEDING A MARGIN THAT WILL BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. VAN EEKELEN ALSO NOTED THAT, IN ITS CSCE PRESENTATION, THE WEST SHOULD PUT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, WHERE THEY PROPERLY BELONG, RATHER THAN UNDER BASKET III.

5. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE LION NOTED THAT SINCE
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HELSINKI, DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED INTERFERENCE AND BELGIUM BELIEVES PRESSURE ON THE EAST IS NECESSARY; IT SHOULD BE MODERATE BUT FIRM. HE RECALLED THAT BELGIUM IS PROPOSING A WESTERN INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE.

6. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE SKETCHED US PERCEPTIONS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A GRADUAL, MANAGED EVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. THIS EVOLUTION HAS INCLUDED IMPROVED LIVING STANDARDS, SOME EASING OF ARBITRARY INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROLS, AND A GROWING RECOGNITION WITHIN SOME EAST EUROPEAN LEADERSHIPS THAT THERE IS SOME ROOM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. IN ARMITAGE'S VIEW, THE EFFECTS OF THE HELSINKI PACT IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE FAR DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ANTICIPATED BY THE KREMLIN. THE AFFIRMATION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE SIGNATORY POWERS, INCLUDING THE EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS, HAVE ENCOURAGED PEOPLES IN THE EAST TO HOPE FOR SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR OWN SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, ARMITAGE THOUGHT THAT OVER THE LONG TERM, BREAD AND BUTTER ISSUES WOULD BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, AND HE CITED POLAND AS A COUNTRY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING CONCESSIONS TO PUBLIC PRESSURES.

7. TURNING TO US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, ARMITAGE STRESSED THAT THE CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER STEMS FROM A BASIC POLITICAL CONVICTION. THIS CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE WOVEN INTO THE FABRIC OF US FOREIGN POLICY. THE US HAS SOUGHT TO MAKE IT CLEAR IN ITS STATEMENT THAT THE US IS NOT DIRECTING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST ANYONE. US CONCERNS ARE GENERAL AND THEIR EXPRESSION WILL HAVE SECRET

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GENERAL APPLICABILITY. WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE US IS NOT TRYING TO FORCE A CHANGE IN THEIR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OR TO SUBVERT THEIR LEADERSHIPS. THE PRACTICES OF COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS WILL DOUBTLESS AFFECT THE PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE ON TRADE AND OTHER COOPERATIVE ENDEAVORS, FOR EXAMPLE, BUT LINKAGE OF ONE TO THE OTHER WILL NOT BE THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH. IN DETERMINING ACTIONS, THE US MUST ACT ALWAYS WITH A CONCERN TO ACHIEVE PRACTICAL RESULTS AND IS SEEKING TO DEVELOP SOME POINTS OF REFERENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PARTICULAR ACTION IS LIKELY TO IMPROVE OR WORSEN THE SITUATION IT IS ADDRESSING.

8. IN RESPONSE TO SUCH AN APPROACH, THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO COUNTER-ATTACK AND POSSIBLY MAKE THREATS OF DIRE CONSEQUENCES. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAVE STRESSED ALL ALONG THAT THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE WOULD NOT BE ABATED. IF WE ARE JUDICIOUS, THEY WILL BE CONSTRAINED TO ACCEPT RULES FOR THE DETENTE GAME WHICH PERMIT A MEASURE OF "IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION" ON BOTH SIDES.

9. ARMITAGE SAID IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THIS IS ONLY ONE STRAND OF US POLICY AND THAT THE US WILL ALSO BE ACTIVELY SEEKING TO MOVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FORWARD: IN NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL, AND IN OTHER AREAS WHERE COOPERATION TO OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT CAN BE EXTENDED. HE ALSO NOTED THAT, IN A SITUATION WHERE OVERALL RELATIONS WERE IMPROVING, PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD ALSO BE INCREASED.

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10. SVART (DENMARK) BELIEVED DETENTE HAS TEMPERED POLITICAL REPRESSION TO A DEGREE IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE, BUT THERE ARE LIMITS TO HOW FAR DETENTE CAN BE PUSHED. HE NEVERTHELESS AGREED WITH THE US THAT THESE LIMITS COULD BE EXTENDED FURTHER. SVART THOUGHT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD ACCEPT A GOOD DEAL OF PRESSURE BEFORE ABANDONING DETENTE, JUST AS IN 1972 THE KREMLIN CONCLUDED THAT THE POSSIBLE GAINS FROM A NIXON VISIT JUSTIFIED THE PRICE OF ACCEPTING THE US MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR.

11. IN OUTLINING THE CANADIAN VIEW, PERMREP HARDY SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WILL USE THREE CRITERIA ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES INVOLVING EASTERN EUROPE: 1) TIMELINESS; 2) EFFICACY, I.E., WHAT REAL SUPPORT CAN BE GIVEN TO DISSENTERS; 3) PRIORITY, I.E., THE RELATIONSHIP
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BETWEEN PRESSURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS COMMERCE. HARDY FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT EAST-WEST RELATIONS BE MANAGED IN A DELIBERATE MANNER, THAT AT BELGRADE WE KEEP THE SOVIETS ENGAGED IN THE DETENTE PROCESS, AND THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS ONLY A PART OF THE FINAL ACT, EVEN IF A CENTRAL PART.

12. KIRCA (TURKEY) OBSERVED THAT A CONSENSUS WAS EMERGING ON A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL CONCERNS;

-- THE EVOLUTION OF EASTERN SOCIETIES IS A PROCESS WHICH WILL TAKE A LONG TIME. THE SITUATION APPEARS DIFFERENT IN THE USSR AND BULGARIA FROM THE SITUATION IN THE OTHER EASTERN BLOC NATIONS.

-- THE THRESHOLD BEYOND WHICH THE USSR FEELS IT WILL LOSE CONTROL SHOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED. OTHERWISE, WE WOULD GO BACK TO A COLD WAR SITUATION.

-- IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE USSR WOULD LINK HUMAN RIGHTS WITH THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. KIRCA ADDED THAT TURKEY BELIEVES IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT CONSULTATIONS CONTINUE AT NATO PRIOR TO ANY DECISIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN APPROACH BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

13. FISCHBACH (LUXEMBOURG) ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH EARLIER COMMENTS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE REACTION OF THE ALLIES NOT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT FORCEFUL VOCAL WESTERN SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD NECESSARILY THREATEN DETENTE AS LONG AS IT IS MODERATE.

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14. BUSCH (NORWAY) OBSERVED THAT FURTHER PROGRESS ON DETENTE WILL PROBABLY DEPEND ON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION WITHIN EASTERN EUROPE. MOREOVER, NORWAY BELIEVES THAT AT BELGRADE THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO

INDICATE ITS INTEREST IN INTERNAL REFORM. HOWEVER, THE WEST SHOULD AVOID TOO STRIDENT A TONE WHICH MIGHT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

15. KILLICK (UK) NOTED THAT SEVERAL PRESENTATIONS HAD MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF CROSSING OVER A THRESHOLD THAT WOULD END DETENTE. HE DID NOT SEE THE SITUATION IN SUCH BLACK AND WHITE TERMS. IN HIS VIEW, THERE WERE SUFFICIENT AREAS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT TO BOTH EAST AND WEST TO INSURE THAT BUSINESS WILL GO ON ALBEIT THE ATMOSPHERE MIGHT BE CHILLY.

16. PAULS (FRG) AGREED THERE MAY BE NO CLEAR THRESHOLD BEYOND WHICH DETENTE WILL SUDDENLY HALT. NEVERTHELESS, HE FEARED THAT TOO FORCEFUL A POSITION ON THE PART OF THE WEST COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THOSE WHOM THE WEST WANTS TO HELP MAY BE FORCED TO SUFFER MORE. HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD LEAD TO A PUBLIC REACTION IN THE WEST AND WOULD CERTAINLY CAUSE A DETERIORATION IN THE ATMOSPHERE. HE URGED THAT THE COUNCIL DEBATE THESE POLICIES AGAIN IN THE FUTURE, FOCUSING ON THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS AS THEY MIGHT AFFECT WESTERN POLICY OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

17. ARMITAGE AGREED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIX PRECISE THRESHOLD FOR OUR POLICIES. SOME SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE THRESHOLD MIGHT CONSIST OF AN ORGANIZED MASS WESTERN CAMPAIGN IN CONJUNCTION WITH DISSENTERS, BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IN A POSITION TO DEFINE THEIR OWN THRESHOLD. AT PRESENT, HE THOUGHT, SUCH CRITICISMS ARE WELL WITHIN THE RANGE OF SOVIET TOLERANCE.

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18. IN SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSION, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL PANSA SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF POLAND, THERE IS AT PRESENT NO STRONG DOMESTIC FOLLOWING FOR DISSIDENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ONE CANNOT RULE OUT FUTURE GROWTH, BUT THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN AUTHORITIES PRESENTLY CONTROL DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS TO THEIR SATISFACTION.

19. SECONDLY, PANSA NOTED THAT MOST SPEAKERS THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE RECONCILED TO A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CRITICISM AS THE PRICE FOR MAINTAINING DETENTE. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS, WITH WESTERN SUPPORT, APPEAR TO THREATEN THE STABILITY OF THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS. THE WEST MUST CONTINUE TO EXPRESS
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ITS MORAL SUPPORT FOR THESE MOVEMENTS, BUT IT MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO ENDANGER EITHER DETENTE OR THE DISSIDENTS WHOM WE WISH TO SUPPORT. PANSA NOTED THERE WAS SOME DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS ON THE LIMITS OF SOVIET TOLERANCE OF CRITICISM ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

20. FINALLY, CONCERNING BELGRADE, PANSA NOTED THAT ALL SPEAKERS AGREED ON THE NEED FOR THE WEST TO FOLLOW A CAREFULLY BALANCED LINE. WHILE THE WEST SHOULD MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE EAST, IT SHOULD NOT SEEK CONFRONTATION.

21. HUNTER (NSC REP) EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE COUNCIL-FOR THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSION. HE SAID THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WOULD BE OF HELP TO PRESIDENT CARTER, WHO WANTS TO HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THE JUDGMENTS OF CLOSE ALLIES AND FRIENDS.

22. MISSION WILL POUCH MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF NAC DISCUSSION TO ADDRESSEES. STRAUSSZ-HUPE

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